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MASS MEDIA MESS:
THE OPTIMISTIC DEREGULATORY GOALS OF
THE "NEXT GENERATION TELEVISION
MARKETPLACE ACT"
"America's television regulatory policies have
come to look like that old closet in your basement
that you keep promising yourself that one day you
will finally clean out."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans love their television. Today, 99% of American
homes contain a television set.' Collectively, Americans watch
250 billion hours of television annually.? In addition to viewing
the traditional free, over-the-air channels that have been the
foundation of broadcast media since its inception, there are a
substantial number of Americans (about 87%) willing to pay cable
or satellite companies hundreds of dollars a year to gain access to
all of their premium shows, news stations, movies and sports
channels.' This subscription number remains high, despite a 60%
increase in subscription fees over the past eight years.' Currently,
1. Outdated Ownership Rules Compulsory License: Hearing on H.R. 3675
and S. 2008 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 112th Cong.
(2012) (statement of Preston Padden, Senior Fellow, Silicon Flatirons Ctr.,
Colo. Law, Univ. of Colo.), available at http://www.siliconflatirons.com/
documents/publications/policy/PaddenTestimony.pdf.
2. Television & Health, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY-NORTHRIDGE,
http://www.csun.edu/science/health/docs/tv&health.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2012).
3. Id.
4. GLEN 0. ROBINSON & THOMAS B. NACHBAR, COMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION 304 (2008) (noting today cable predominates over satellite by a
margin of more than two to one, but that the margin has been steadily declining
as satellite has increased its market penetration at the expense of cable); Eliana
Dockterman, Cable Wars. Why Channel Blackouts are Getting Worse, TIME,
Aug. 6, 2012, at 20.
5. Dockterman, supra note 4, at 20.
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cable and satellite television generate hundreds of billions of
dollars per year.6 Media is, without question, big business.
The broadcast media landscape is rapidly changing and is nearly
as diverse as the scope of human imagination. In addition to a
wide range of programs and targeted niche networks, there is a
growing and increasingly diverse system for how signals and
programs get delivered: traditional over-the-air broadcast, cable,
satellite, internet, or by-mail subscription. Yet, even as new
choices in programming become available and technology
continues to change the ways media is transmitted and delivered,
the current regulatory structure under which broadcasting operates
remains largely outdated. It is in this context that Congress now
seeks to reexamine the government's role in regulating such
programming, and its role in the business of acquiring and
distributing (or redistributing) that programming to viewers.'
With this changing broadcast landscape as a backdrop, this
article will address two Bills recently proposed in Congress that
seek to dramatically change the way broadcast and non-broadcast
signal owners negotiate financial agreements for their signal and
program rights with the companies that transmit those programs to
the viewers through cable and satellite.' These two Bills together,
collectively referred to as the Next Generation Television
Marketplace Act ("NGTMA"), would repeal compulsory copyright
licenses, various mandates regarding retransmission consent rules,
cable "must-carry" and satellite "carry one, carry all"
requirements, as well as Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) broadcast and media ownership rules.9 Specifically, the
6. Other Industry Data, NAT'L CABLE & TELEVISION Ass'N,
http://www.ncta.com/StatsGroup/OtherlndustryData.aspx (last visited Oct. 28,
2012).
7. See Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, H.R. 3675, 112th Cong.
(2011); Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008, 112th Cong.
(2011).
8. See H.R. 3675; S. 2008. The main difference between a broadcast and a
non-broadcast signal is a viewer's ability to receive a broadcast signal using a
traditional television antenna while a non-broadcast signal requires a viewer's
connection to some other signal-receiver, either through a cable or satellite
provider. 47 C.F.R. § 101.1407 (2012).
9. H.R. 3675; S. 2008.
202
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss1/6
2MASS MEDIA MESS
Bills would also revise the 1976 Copyright Act and the Satellite
Acts passed in 1999 and 2004 to the extent the acts relate to these
rules."o Among the proposed changes, NGTMA would amend 17
U.S.C. § 111 and repeal 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122 of the Copyright
Act, as well as repeal 47 U.S.C §§ 325(b), 338, 534 of the
Communications Act."
There has not been fundamental reform to the compulsory
copyright structure since Congress passed the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act in 1992 ("Cable Act of
1992").12 Additionally, legitimate lingering issues remain with the
regulation of satellite television since the last reform in 2004.
NGTMA provides Congress with an opportunity to reexamine the
most outdated elements of the regulatory system that in many
ways have not kept pace with technology and the practical realities
of today's marketplace. Although the proposed Bills are
politically ideological and impracticable to implement, they
nevertheless create dialogue regarding the Federal Government's
proper role in regulating television, cable, and satellite
broadcasting." With so many people affected and so much money
at stake, it is an area of regulatory law worth reconsidering.
Even with the ideological and rather overly optimistic goals of
NGTMA understood, it is clear the system will eventually need
fundamental reform, making discussion of the proposals outlined
in the Bills particularly relevant. Ultimately, nearly every party
involved in the creation, distribution, and consumption of media
has a potential stake in the outcome here-from the copyright
owners of the programs to the broadcasters to the satellite and
10. H.R. 3675; S. 2008; Press Release, Congressman Steve Scalise, Scalise,
DeMint Introduce Legislation to Deregulate Television Market (Dec. 11, 2011),
available at http://scalise.house.gov/press-release/scalise-demint-introduce-
legislation-deregulate-television-market.
11. H.R. 3675 §§ 2-3; S. 2008 §§ 2-3.
12. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
13. Ideological in that the Bills tend to have support from Congress's more
fiscally conservative members and are largely seen as consistent with other
overall deregulatory goals, and impracticable regarding the sheer scope of the
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cable companies, as well as the viewers. Concerns over the cost of
television programming are illustrated by the rising number of
carriage disputes between broadcasters and satellite and cable
companies. 4 There is also debate over whether the current system
provides fair market compensation to copyright owners or if the
rates have been set intentionally low."
The scope of NGTMA is too broad and the subject matter so
intertwined for a complete analysis within this article. The Bills
essentially seek to overhaul decades of administrative law,
dismantling large parts of the current regulatory structure in the
process. Consequently, this article will address two main
components of NGTMA: (1) the revisions to the copyright
compulsory license provisions of 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 122 and
(2) the changes to the provisions of the Cable and Satellite Acts
codified in 47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b), 338, 534.'6 This article will also
consider the various ways these changes are meant to encourage
fair compensation for programming rights while also protecting
Congress's long-held concerns for localism and diversity in the
media. 7
14. A carriage dispute occurs when a signal owner disagrees with the
company licensed to retransmit that signal over compensation, either financial
or otherwise, for the right to retransmission. See Dockterman, supra note 4, at
20; BATTLEGROUND: THE MEDIA 69-75 (Robin Anderson & Jonathan Gray eds.,
2008), available at http://newmediagr.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/17171370-
battleground-themedia.pdf. While often resolved without notice, carriage
disputes have othertimes led to signals and programs being dropped or "blacked
out" from the programming lineups of the cable or satellite provider involved,
leading to viewing disruptions for consumers and lost revenue. See
Dockterman, supra note 4, at 20. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.
15. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT 69 (2008), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/sectionl 09-final-report.pdf [hereinafter
SHVERA 109 Report].
16. H.R. 3675; S. 2008.
17. BRUCE W. OWEN, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV.,
CONSUMER WELFARE AND TV PROGRAM REGULATION 10 (2012), available at
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Welfare-TV-Program-
Regulation.pdf. The continuing benefit to promoting localism is that local
stations provide a particularly unique public service regarding their ability to
relay information of local concern, such as severe weather, school closings, and
204
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Part II of this article discusses the background of the Bill,
recounting a brief history of telecommunication regulation in the
United States. This will provide the necessary context for
understanding the existing law, as well as illustrate the vast areas
of current telecom law that are clearly outdated.
Part III considers the two NGTMA Bills currently proposed in
Congress and summarizes the full breadth of the proposed changes
to the law. Part IV will specifically analyze the effects the
proposed Bills would have on the copyright compulsory licenses
and the (1) retransmission consent, (2) must-carry and (3) carry
one, carry all rules created in the Cable Act of 1992 and Satellite
Acts of 1999 and 2004. The analysis examines who is in favor of
the changes and who opposes them, as well as the fundamental
public policy considerations involved. Part IV also discusses the
practicality of implementing the comprehensive reforms NGTMA
proposes. While the Bills are meant to eliminate areas of the
Copyright and Communications Acts that many in the cable and
satellite industries, and in Congress, believe are unnecessarily
complex and long outdated, the logistical requirements involved in
negotiating for each station and program individually is still likely
unworkable given current technological capabilities. Indeed, these
technological limitations were a driving force behind the statutory
requirements agreed to initially." Finally, this section will discuss
how the proposed amendments to the current regulations are meant
to help consumers, which is also a significant goal of NGTMA.
All of the policy goals are worthy and well-intentioned.
However, while the proposals would undoubtedly allow for a more
competitive, free market environment for primary and secondary
broadcasters to negotiate their rights, the practicality of passing
road closures, quickly and efficiently. See Paul Cowling, An Earthy Enigma:
The Role of Localism in the Political, Cultural and Economic Dimensions of
Media Ownership Regulation, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 266
(2005).
18. Interview with John C. Roberts, Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law,
DePaul University College of Law, in Chi., Ill. (Oct. 12, 2012).
2052012]
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such comprehensive reform as currently written is, nevertheless,
unlikely.1
Finally, Part V concludes the article with a summary of the
various positions asserted along with a reflection of the obstacles
Congress faces in passing the Bills.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Telecommunication Regulation in the United States
Despite often claiming otherwise, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has a long history of being anti-competitive
and being particularly protective of established modes of
communication.20 Much of this protectionist policy comes from
the FCC's fundamental belief in aligning mass communication
with the public interest.2' To understand the policy, consider the
beginnings of telecommunication regulation in the United States.
In the aftermath of the Titanic disaster, the Federal Government
issued new licensing requirements through the Radio Act of 1912,
which forbade radio broadcasting without a license, and granted
the Secretary of Commerce the ability to allocate broadcast
frequencies and times.22
19. A primary broadcaster broadcasts directly to viewers (such as a local
station does) while a secondary broadcaster must first pick up a signal from a
primary broadcaster before retransmitting that signal to viewers (such as most
cable and satellite companies do). 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(l)-(2) (2006). Today,
when the term "broadcaster" is used in a technical sense it tends to refer to
primary broadcasters, while secondary broadcasters are generally referred to as
"distributors" or "multiple video programming distributors" (MVPDs).
Interview with John C. Roberts, supra note 18.
20. Interview with John C. Roberts, supra note 18.
21. Philip M. Napoli, Retransmission Consent and Broadcaster Commitment
to Localism, 20 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 345, 346 (2011).
22. Gregory M. Prindle, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has
Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 284-85 (2003) (noting that prior to the 1912 Act,
"[g]overnment and business use ... conflicted with amateur radio operators,
who interfered with official broadcasts and crowded out naval and business
communications. A few agitators even posed as admirals and issued phony
orders to naval ships"); John S. Leibovitz, The Great Spectrum Debate: A
206
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However, under the original 1912 Act, the Secretary of
Commerce had no power to deny radio licensing or re-assign those
frequencies, a denial of authority confirmed by a U.S. federal court
in 1926 in response to then-Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover's
attempts to reduce overcrowding of the broadcast frequency
spectrum.23 Through the Radio Act of 1927, Congress created the
Federal Radio Commission, which allowed the government to
intervene and abolish radio stations that were deemed non-useful
to the public.24  At the time, this was sufficient to address the
policy concerns of both the radio stations and the courts. Congress
followed with the Communications Act of 1934, which provided
for the creation of the FCC and brought radio, telephone and
broadcast communications under the same regulatory scheme.2 5
Both the 1927 Radio Act and the 1934 Communications Act
provided that licenses be granted in accordance with "the public
convenience, interest, or necessity," language still codified in the
law today.26 While the statutory language does not define "public
interest," both the FCC through its regulations and courts through
affirmative case law have made clear that satisfying the public
Commentary on the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force's Report on Spectrum
Rights and Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH. 390, 413 (2004) (noting that
"[w]hen a breakdown in radio communication prevented other nearby ships
from hearing the Titanic's distress calls, popular opinion and political forces
turned against unfettered access to the airwaves").
23. Prindle, supra note 22, at 287.
24. Id. at 287-88; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969)
(explaining the reasoning behind the Radio Act: "[b]efore 1927, the allocation
of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos. It
quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scare resource
whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government.
Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the
cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably
heard. Consequently, the Federal Radio Commission was established to allocate
frequencies among competing applicants in a manner responsive to the public
'convenience, interest, or necessity."').
25. See generally Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§151-615(b)
(2006).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2006).
2072012]
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interest includes promoting policies that protect diversity and
localism, particularly with regard to local news and public affairs.27
Over the several decades following the Communications Act of
1934, it became increasingly clear that viewers largely prefer
national network programs to those produced locally; local
broadcast stations quickly complied by affiliating themselves with
national network programming, especially in prime time.28 Today,
local television stations rarely produce local programming apart
from local news and the occasional political roundtable or debate,29
because the costs are too high and the viewership just too low.
Nevertheless, the FCC never abandoned its preference for
localism, which translated into the retransmission consent rules, as
well as the must-carry cable rules and the carry one, carry all
satellite rules.30
B. Cable and Satellite Compulsory Copyright Licenses
As local stations began to decrease their number of locally-
produced, locally-broadcast programs in favor of national network
programming and as more cable and satellite companies began to
compete with local broadcasters for viewers, the programming-
distribution market became increasingly complex. Programming
today often goes through a lengthy distribution and retransmission
process before it reaches the viewer, creating new copyright
concerns for rights owners in the process. Today, potential
27. Prindle, supra note 22, at 289.
28. OWEN, supra note 17, at 10. In the United States, "prime time" generally
refers to the time between 8:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. in the Eastern and Pacific
Time Zones, and 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. in the Central and Mountain Time
Zones, when viewership and advertising revenue is highest. 47 C.F.R. §
79.3(a)(6) (2012).
29. Deborah Potter, Katerina-Eva Matsa & Amy Mitchell, Local TV: By the
Numbers, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN
JOURNALISM, (Pew Research Ctr.'s Project for Excellence in Journalism 2011),
available at http://stateofthemedia.org/201 1/local-tv-essay/data-page-3/ (noting
that in the span between 2007-2010, local news airing on the local affiliates of
the four major networks-ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC-lost more than 2 million
viewers of their early evening newscasts, or about 8.5% of the audience).
30. OWEN, supra note 17, at 10. See also discussion supra Part II.C.
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copyright holders include local stations, broadcast networks,
syndicators and other independent program producers (including
various production companies, movie producers, and professional
sports leagues). Each of these copyright holders want to ensure
they are fairly compensated for their programming, but free market
negotiation of individual copyright licenses for hundreds of shows
ultimately proved impracticable." Thus, to help facilitate the
process, Congress established a system of compulsory copyright
licenses codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 122. Many of the
current copyright issues NGTMA addresses arise from the way
these compulsory licenses are determined and the outdated
assumptions the current law still applies.
1. Copyright Act of 19 76, 17 U.S.C. § 111
The early function of cable television was to facilitate over-the-
air (OTA) reception to areas that could not receive a strong
broadcast signal because of their geographic location.32 Cable
operators, then known as community antenna television (CATV)
systems, provided signals to these areas.33 Up until the 1970s, a
cable system's channel lineup consisted almost entirely of
retransmitted broadcast signals, with little original cable
programming.34 Today, however, the vast majority of a cable
system's channel lineup consists of non-broadcast networks, with
the cable industry having evolved into the leading supplier of
subscription-based video programming." It was under the
outdated system of the 1970s that the Copyright Act addressed the
needs of cable broadcasting.
31. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 81 (noting that "Congress
recognized 'that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require
every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was
transmitted by a cable system."' (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 89 (1976))). See infra text accompanying note 42.
32. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 82.
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Two Supreme Court cases decided in the years just prior to the
1976 Act-Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415
U.S. 394 (1974)-noted particular copyright implications
regarding the retransmission of OTA broadcast signals by CATV
cable companies. 6 In Fortnightly Corp., the Court held that
CATV systems were (1) more like viewers than they were to
broadcasters; (2) that CATV systems did not broadcast or
rebroadcast, but "simply carri[ed], without editing, whatever
programs they receive[d]"; and (3) that CATV operators did not
"perform the programs they receive[d] and carr[ied]," and thus did
not violate the original broadcaster's copyright. The
Teleprompter Corp. decision additionally protected CATV
operators against copyright infringement liability for picking up
"distant" signals and importing them from one community into
another."
When the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed, a valid concern for
broadcasters was whether cable companies could or would face
copyright liability for cable retransmissions.3 9 The Fortnightly
Corp. and Teleprompter Corp. decisions distressed both the
original broadcasters whose signals were being retransmitted as
well as local broadcasters in the receiving end communities, who,
as the decision noted, "watched the cable companies importing
into their markets the very programs that they were themselves
showing, and to which they had purchased exclusive broadcast
rights."40 As stated in the post-1976 Copyright Act decision,
United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F. 2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
essentially, "cable companies were free, as far as copyright law
was concerned, to pick up signals aired by broadcasters and
36. ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 314.
37. Id. (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 392 U.S.
390, 400-02 (1968)).
38. Id. Distant signals are signals carried by cable systems which cannot be
received over the air in the area covered by the cable system. 17 U.S.C. §
11I1(5)(a)(i).
39. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 2.
40. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
210
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retransmit them throughout the country."4 1 The United Video, Inc.
opinion goes on to note, however, that while the FCC for a period
of time attempted to review the importation of distant signals into
any of the top one hundred local television markets, this proved
"an administrative impossibility."42
Thus, Congress was next concerned with how to provide cost-
efficient ways for the cable and satellite operators to obtain rights
for the programming they retransmitted.43 Although at that time
cable systems were not the hundred-plus channel, subscription-
based carriage systems they are today, they nevertheless carried
signals with programming owned by dozens, if not hundreds, of
separate copyright owners." With the aim of creating a more
practical system, Congress adopted 17 U.S.C. § 111 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, implementing a compulsory licensing
scheme where cable companies would pay an administratively set
fee in exchange for the right to carry the distant signals and
programs.4 5 In its 2008 Report, however, the Copyright Office
claimed that under the system developed by the 1976 Copyright
Act, cable companies had been paying statutory rates that
economists believed were far below the rates the cable companies
would pay if the regulations disappeared in favor of the free
market.4 6 This apparent discrepancy in fees is a main reason why
tensions have risen in recent years between broadcasters and cable
companies and one of the principal concerns of NGTMA.
2. Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA), 17 U.S. C. § 119
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new participant in
broadcasting emerged:"7 the growth of direct broadcast satellite
(DBS) during the two decades after the passage of 1976 Copyright
41. Id. at 1176-77.
42. Id. at 1177.
43. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 2.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 69.
47. ROBINsON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 365.
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Act was "phenomenal."48 The 1976 Act never addressed the
copyright issues of DBS, which "were not then in existence or
even under active development."4 9 Consequently, problems-and
lawsuits-began to arise, concerning satellite carriers that did not
fit directly into, yet still claimed to operate under, the 17 U.S.C. §
111 rules."o Notably, differences in technology and similar
recurring issues of localism underscored the debate." First, in
1988, and then several times throughout the 1990s, Congress tried
to address some of these uncertainties through additional
legislation.52
During these early days of home satellite, DBS systems were
unable (because of channel capacity limitations) to offer local
stations into each local market (known as "local-into-local"
service), but were able to-and did-offer distant signals of
network programming." This was done by the DBS operators
essentially intercepting the "wholesale" signal that broadcast
networks would relay to their local affiliates and then directing
that intercepted signal to the home satellite subscribers.54 Much of
48. Thomas Hildebrandt, Unplugging the Cable Franchise: A Regulatory
Framework to Promote the IPTV Cable Alternative, 42 GA. L. REV. 227, 238
(2007) (noting DBS as one of the "fastest growing electronic consumer products
of all time" (quoting Richard L. Weber, Riding on a Diamond in the Sky: The
DBS Set-Aside Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1795, 1798 (1999))). Additionally, the period between 1994 and 1999 saw vast
changes come to the home satellite television industry, with major companies
like DirecTV emerging and growing from under a million subscribers in 1994 to
over ten million by 2001. The History of DirecTV, SATELLITE COMPANION,
http://www.satellitecompanion.com/Television/DirecTVHistory.aspx (last
visited Nov. 8, 2012).
49. ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 368.
50. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 9.
51. Satellite Broad. & Commc'ns Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir.
2001) (noting that "[w]hereas cable systems deliver their signals to subscribers
over local wire networks, satellite is primarily a national service.").
52. ROBINsON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 368-69.
53. Satellite Broad, 275 F.3d at 347 (noting that "[early DBS carriers] had
enough capacity to carry the signals of network affiliates in a major city (usually
New York) throughout the entire country, but not enough capacity to carry local
network affiliates in smaller cities.").
54. ROBINsON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 368.
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the Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA) of 1988 was passed to
protect local cable systems and local affiliate stations from DBS
competition." The Act did allow, however, for DBS systems "to
retransmit the signals of distant network broadcast stations to
unserved households that were unable to receive an adequate over-
the-air signal" through a limited copyright license."
Recognizing satellite providers would need compulsory
copyright regulation as well, Congress codified 17 U.S.C. § 119
through the 1988 Act. The legislation created a statutory
copyright licensing scheme similar to the one granted to cable in
17 U.S.C. § I 11, yet calculated differently." Under the structure
established in 1988 and still in place today, satellite carriers pay a
flat royalty fee based on their number of subscribers while cable
companies pay royalties based on a complex formula tied to
system size and gross receipts."
However necessary they were at the time they were
implemented, the statutory licenses in 17 U.S.C. § 119 were not
meant to last indefinitely."o These rules were intended to expire in
1994, as Congress expected satellite providers to be able to
independently negotiate licensing agreements for the
retransmission of broadcasts.6 1 However, in 1994, Congress
reauthorized 17 U.S.C. § 119 for five more years with the
agreement that satellite carriers would pay rates that reflected
market price, unlike cable systems which pay royalty rates
55. Id. Satellite Home Viewer Act, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988).
56. ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 373. A "distant" signal refers to
television stations broadcast to viewers from outside their Designated Market
Area (DMA). 17 U.S.C. § 11 1(5)(a)(i). Designated Market Area (DMA) refers
to the geographic area that is able to receive an over the air broadcast signal
from a local broadcast station and from which the majority of a local station's
viewers originate, as defined by Nielsen Media Research. 47 C.F.R. §
79.3(a)(1) (2012).
57. ROBINsoN & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 368.
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adjusted only for inflation.6 2 By matching the statutory rates with
market rates, Congress believed it could eliminate the need for the
statutory licenses by the end of 1999.63 That never happened.
Additionally, rapid growth in the DBS industry in the decades
since 17 U.S.C. § 119 was established has led the U.S. Copyright
Office to conclude that satellite companies have also been paying
statutory rates for the import of distant signals into local markets
that are set below their fair market value.' Ultimately, the
Copyright Office proposed the phase out of both 17 U.S.C. §§ 111,
119 in their 2008 report, with the primary goals of (1) simplifying
the existing statutory licenses and (2) increasing the parity between
cable systems and satellite carriers." Just as it does with the cable
licenses under 17 U.S.C. § 111, the proposed legislation seeks to
address the statutory rate discrepancies under 17 U.S.C. § 119.66
3. Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (SHVIA), 17
U.S.C. § 122
By 1999, advancements in satellite technology allowed DBS
carriers to offer local-to local service in some markets.6 7 The
localism concerns that led Congress to pass SHVA a decade
earlier-in large part to protect local cable and broadcast stations
from satellite competition-seemed to dissipate some as Congress
began to see DBS as an effective competitor to cable that could
drive down the price of subscription television.68 In order to
encourage the development of DBS local-to-local service,
Congress included a royalty-free license within 17 U.S.C. § 122.69
6 2. Id.
63. Id.
64. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 10.
65. Id. at 56 (noting "[t]he overall findings .. . are that royalty rates are
below marketplace rates, that the current distant signal licenses have served
their purpose but are no longer necessary, and that [17 U.S.C. § 111, 119] have
outlived their original purposes.").
66. H.R. 3675 § 3; S. 2008 § 3.
67. Hildebrandt, supra note 48, at 239.
68. ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 373.
69. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 11.
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Generally, 17 U.S.C. § 122 is similar to 17 U.S.C. § 119, but
instead addresses satellite retransmissions of local programming
within the station's own market (local-to-local)." One of the
motivating factors behind the 17 U.S.C. § 122 royalty-free license
was Congress's desire to decrease the number of distant signals
delivered to subscribers in favor of those of local network
affiliates, thus, preserving the network-affiliate relationship in the
local television market." In the same 2008 report, the Copyright
Office explained that Congress justified the royalty-free license by
adopting the principal that "copyright owners are not harmed by
the retransmission of programming into local markets" since "the
copyrighted programming contained on local broadcast
programming is already licensed with the expectation that all
viewers in the local market will be able to view the
programming."72
Part of the urgency in passing reform is that the particular
compulsory copyright licenses granted to satellite operators are set
to expire at the end of 2014." Congress can (and given its recent
history of doing so, perhaps likely will) simply extend the current
license again. However, the pending expiration of the satellite
compulsory licenses provides Congress as good an opportunity as
any to reexamine the current system.
C. Cable Act of 1992, Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of
1999, and Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization
Act of2004: 47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b), 338, 534
In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act, containing additional localism
protection measures.74 For one, the 1992 Act restored a provision
70. 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
71. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 13.
72. Id.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 119(c)(1)(E) (2006).
74. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). See also Cable Television, NET INDUSTRIES,
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that requires cable systems to carry all local broadcast channels in
a given market, known as "must-carry" rules, and prohibits cable
operators from charging local broadcasters for the cable system to
carry the broadcaster's signal." Surviving two U.S. Supreme
Court challenges regarding their constitutionality under the First
Amendment, these must-carry rules are meant to ensure that every
local station-in essence, every local voice-is assured carriage
through the local cable system."
The 1992 Act also created a new "retransmission consent" right,
allowing broadcasters to demand payment from the cable and
satellite companies (herein referred to as "multichannel video
programming distributors" or "MVPDs") for the broadcast signals
that they carry other than those included under the must-carry
requirement."
Notably, the retransmission consent requirements are not
attached to the particular broadcast programs an MVPD carries,
but instead are attached to the signals themselves." The issue
comes up particularly in smaller designated market areas (DMAs)
and other rural areas of the country where there may be only one
or two network-affiliated local channels, or none at all." Often the
programming of local, non-network-affiliated stations will consist
largely of imported syndicated programming that is not locally
produced." Thus, the negotiations between local broadcast
stations and MVPDs regarding retransmission consent rights may
also involve negotiations between the stations and the various
75. Id.
76. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994) (noting "[t]he
rules benefit all full power broadcasters who request carriage-be they
commercial or noncommercial, independent or network affiliated, English or
Spanish language, religious or secular."). See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
77. ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 357. The term "multichannel
video programming distributor" (MVPD) is an industry-recognized term
referring to cable or satellite companies that retransmit both over-the-air (OTA)
signals and non-broadcast networks (such as popular networks ESPN and USA).
47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 76.64(d) (2012).
78. ROBINsON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 357.
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programs' copyright owners as well, further complicating the
process."
Every three years, local stations are statutorily required to decide
between exercising their retransmission consent or must-carry
rights.8 2 Thus, under the provisions, local stations can-and often
do-choose to waive their must-carry right in favor of
retransmission consent and the accompanying fees they can
charge." Generally, the decision comes down to the bargaining
positions of the particular broadcaster and MVPD. For example, a
popular, network affiliated local channel will more likely assert its
retransmission consent right, knowing the cable or satellite
provider will be at a significant competitive disadvantage within
the local market if it were not able to offer the channel to
subscribers, given the popularity of the network programming."
Conversely, a small, local non-commercial station will generally
opt instead for must-carry."
While retransmission consent applies to both cable and satellite
providers, however, the must-carry rules are cable specific." In
order to rebalance the competitive scale, Congress created an
additional mandatory carriage requirement, this time directing it
towards DBS." Known as the "carry one, carry all" rule, the
requirement, also created as part of SHVIA in 1999, mandates that
an MVPD providing satellite service to a local area must carry all
local channels if it chooses to carry any one." Unlike cable, DBS
is not required to carry any of the local channels in a given area,
but if it chooses to carry one, it does so under an all-or-none
81. ROBINsON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 357.
82. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(B); 47 C.F.R. § 76.64(f)(2) (2012).
83. ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 357-58. Current estimates
suggest between 80-90% of all local stations choose retransmission consent. Id.
at 378. The risk is, however, that if a local broadcaster chooses the
retransmission consent option and fails to negotiate a deal with the MVPD, it
waives its must-carry right and will not be carried. Id. at 357.
84. Interview with John C. Roberts, supra note 18. See also infra Part IV.B.
85. Id.
86. ROBINsON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 840.
87. Id. at 375.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 338 (2006).
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format.8 9 The idea was to prevent satellite carriers from "cherry-
picking"-choosing to carry only the local network-affiliated
stations-a reasonable concern and one Congress sought to
avoid."0
The difference in law again reflects the differences in
technology.91 The theory at the time SHVIA was passed was that
while cable systems are local and have enough channel capacity to
carry all the local broadcast stations and still have room on their
systems to offer an "attractive mix" of national and regional non-
broadcast programming, the capacity of DBS was substantially
more limited.92 Along with the carry one, carry all requirement,
SHVIA additionally brought satellite under the same network non-
duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules that originally applied
only to cable."
The regulatory history reflects Congress's attempts to keep
legislative pace with rapidly changing technologies and an
increasingly complex marketplace. Yet ultimately, in the view of
many of the proponents of reform, the current regulatory structure
is an overly complicated, outdated system that fails to protect the
very policy interests it is meant to support. It is under this context
that Congress has introduced NGTMA.
89. ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 4, at 375.
90. Rob Frieden, Analog and Digital Must-Carry Obligations of Cable and
Satellite Television Operators in the United States, 15 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 230,
241 (2006).
91. ROBINSON & NACHBAR,supra note 4, at 375.
92. Id. (noting that satellite carriers, "in contrast [to cable systems], currently
beam the same 450 to 500 channels throughout the continental United States
and thus could not comply with a rule requiring them to retransmit the signals of
each of the country's roughly 1,600 local broadcast stations.").
93. Id. at 383. Generally, network non-duplication rules prevent MVPDs
from importing duplicate network signals into a given market, while syndicated
exclusivity rules prevent MVPDs from importing duplicate syndicated
programming. Id. at 836. Together, these rules are important areas of the
current regulatory system; however, this article will limit its analysis of them to
the specific areas relevant to the other provisions discussed.
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III. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION:
NEXT GENERATION TELEVISION MARKETPLACE ACT ("NGTMA"),
HOUSE BILL 3675 (2011), AND SENATE BILL 2008 (2011)
In December of 2011, Representative Steve Scalise (R-
Louisiana) and Senator Jim DeMint (R-South Carolina) introduced
House Bill 3675 and Senate Bill 2008, respectively, as a means of
addressing some of the most outdated sections of the current law.94
Much of the general structure of the two Bills mirrors each other
throughout and, thus, the Bills will be outlined here congruently.
It is noted when the structure of the two Bills differ.
Section 1 provides that the Bills will be cited as the "Next
Generation Television Marketplace Act" (H.R. 3675) and "Next
Generation Television Marketplace Act of 2011" (S. 2008)."
Section 2 amends or repeals sections of the Communications
Act of 1934, including an amendment to 47 U.S.C. § 338 and a
repeal of 47 U.S.C. § 534 that would essentially eliminate the
cable must-carry and the satellite carry one, carry all rules.9' The
changes would in effect make the existing requirements applicable
only to qualified noncommercial educational television stations
and eliminate the protections for commercial stations.97 The Bills
would also eliminate 47 U.S.C. § 325(b), effectively erasing
broadcasters' retransmission consent rights and restoring 47
U.S.C. § 325 to its pre-1992 state." Additionally, section 2 would
repeal the network non-duplication rule codified in 47 U.S.C. §
340, as well as the syndicated exclusivity rule codified in 47
U.S.C. § 612.99
Section 3 amends or repeals those provisions regarding the
compulsory copyright licenses created under the Copyright Act of
94. Press Release, Congressman Steve Scalise, supra note 10.
95. H.R. 3675 § 1, S. 2008 § 1.
96. H.R. 3675 § 2, S. 2008 § 2.
97. H.R. 3675 § 2, S. 2008 § 2.
98. Ryan Radia, A Free Market Defense of Retransmission Consent,
OPENMARKET.ORG (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.openmarket.org/2012/04/11/a-
free-market-defense-of-retransmission-consent/.
99. H.R. 3675 § 2, S. 2008 § 2.
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1976.' Specifically, the proposals include amending 17 U.S.C. §
111, and repealing 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122. As discussed, these
three sections of the Copyright Act of 1976 allow the U.S. Federal
Government to issue statutory licenses permitting MVPDs to
retransmit broadcast signals without having to negotiate each
copyright license individually.
Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 111 addresses secondary transmissions
of broadcast programming by cable."o' Section 119 addresses
secondary transmissions of distant television programming by
satellite' 02 while 17 U.S.C. § 122 addresses secondary
transmissions of local television programming by satellite.o3
Section 4 repeals several additional current FCC rules related to
cross-media ownership and, in doing so, eliminates: (1) restrictions
on the number of television stations that a person or entity may
own, operate, or control in the same designated market area under
the local television multiple ownership rule; (2) the radio-
television cross-ownership rule; and (3) limitations on the direct or
indirect ownership, operation, or control of a broadcast television
station by a person or entity that owns, operates, or controls a daily
newspaper under the daily newspaper cross-ownership rule.104
Section 5 (Section 6 in S. 2008) provides that the Acts shall take
effect on July 1, 2014.'0'
Section 6 (Section 5 in S. 2008) sets forth transitional provisions
preserving certain contracts, understandings, and arrangements
related to retransmission consent and the distribution of video
programming entered into prior to the enactment of NGTMA. 06
The following analysis section addresses specifically the
proposed changes to (1) the compulsory copyright licenses for
both cable and satellite providers codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 111,
199, 122; and (2) the repeal of sections of the Communications
Act relating to carry one, carry all and must-carry rules (codified
100. H.R. 3675 § 3, S. 2008 § 3.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2006).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
104. H.R. 3675 § 4, S. 2008 § 4.
105. H.R. 3675 § 5, S. 2008 § 6.
106. H.R. 3675 § 6, S. 2008 § 5.
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in 47 U.S.C. §§ 338, 534, respectively), as well as the elimination
of the retransmission consent rules codified in 47 U.S.C. § 325(b).
IV. ANALYSIS
This section examines two key provisions of the Next
Generation Television Marketplace Act (NGTMA): (1) the
amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 111 and repeal of 17 U.S.C. §§ 119,
122 that would eliminate the current compulsory copyright
licenses and (2) the amendment to 47 U.S.C. § 338 and repeal of
47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b), 534 that would effectively erase the
retransmission consent, must-carry and carry one, carry all rules of
the Communications Act. First, this section explains the
competing arguments for and against deregulation, with a
particular focus on why some level of change to the current system
is needed. Then, this section explains the logistical issues
NGTMA faces and a summary of why the well-intentioned Bill is
unlikely to pass.
A. Disposing of the Compulsory Copyright Licenses
As discussed, Congress created the compulsory copyright
licenses codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 122 of the Copyright
Act as a way to facilitate efficient negotiations between
broadcasters and MVPDs. While the system in place has
undoubtedly made it easier for both sides to negotiate the
copyright royalties of the hundreds of channels and thousands of
programs involved every week, broadcasters and other program
copyright owners have started to voice complaints that the current
royalty rates set within 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (cable) and 119 (satellite
as it relates to distant signals) are significantly lower than the fair
market value copyright holders could receive if they negotiate in a
deregulated market."
A 2008 U.S. Copyright Office report identified that the current
statutory license rates are set below fair market values.0o While
107. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 69. As noted, 17 U.S.C. § 122
is a royalty-free license. 17 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2006).
108. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 69.
2012] 221
21
Cooper: Mass Media Mess: The Optimistic Deregulatory Goals of the "Next G
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:201
the report indicates the Copyright Office's belief that below-
market rates may have been justifiable earlier in the history of the
broadcast industry, it proceeds to conclude that the current rates
have lost their relevance.'0 9 Proponents of the Bill argue that while
emerging MVPDs may have benefited from a heavier regulatory
environment in the past, the industry in its current state would
benefit more if copyright owners could themselves negotiate fair
market rates with respect to copyright royalty fees.
A key component of 17 U.S.C. § 119 remaining today comes
from Congress's original intent to serve "unserved households;"
that is, areas of the country that cannot receive traditional OTA
broadcast signals nor has access to cable service."o These
transmissions will often include retransmission of distant network
television stations, usually from a major market such as New York
or Los Angeles, or, in the early days of satellite, nationwide
"superstations," such as WTBS out of Atlanta or WGN from
Chicago."' These networks cannot rely solely on local advertising
revenue to cover the value cost of the additional viewers to the
program owners' copyrights (the idea being that local advertisers
are generally not willing to pay increased advertising rates for
viewers in distant markets who the advertisers cannot reasonably
expect to purchase their goods and services locally)."2 Congress
determined that retransmission of distant signals affected the value
of copyrighted broadcast programming since the content was
reaching larger audiences, but nonetheless also determined
MVPDs had no reason to pay additional costs to copyright owners
for the additional viewers outside a particular designated market
area (DMA) since those viewers could not increase local
broadcasters' advertising revenue."'
109. Id. at 212.
110. Id.
111. Id. WTBS has since spun off as a non-broadcast network, TBS, that is
popular on both cable and satellite lineups. Id. at 48-49. In 2007, the station
officially split from the local Atlanta OTA channel WTBS, effectively ending
operation as a "superstation." WTBS to Become Peachtree TV, ATLANTA Bus.
CHRONICLE (June 27, 2007, 10:11 PM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/
atlanta/stories/2007/06/25/daily32.html?surround=lfn.
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However, the access concerns that Congress considered in
developing the compulsory copyright licenses of 17 U.S.C. §§ 111,
119, while far from being irrelevant, nevertheless no longer
completely reflect the economic realities of today's multi-billion
dollar cable and satellite industry. The 2008 U.S. Copyright
Office report points to one of the rare case studies that has been
able to break apart the various regulatory layers by looking at
statutory compensation for the TBS network since it became a
non-broadcast cable network in 1998 separate from its distant
WTBS superstation signal."4 Finding that as a cable network,
"carrying the same programming as it had as a distant signal, TBS
was able to immediately obtain license fees that exceed[ed] the
entire 1998 royalty fund ($165 million for TBS vs. $108 million
for the royalty fund)," and by 2004, more than double the amount
($287 million to $134 million), the report seeks to demonstrate the
incredible valuation increases that are possible under
deregulation." 5 However, it is worth noting, that TBS is also one
of the most popular non-broadcast networks currently offered, with
programming including "Conan" and Major League Baseball, and
may not alone reflect potential value increases for other networks.
Yet, even recognizing such findings, many broadcasters
nevertheless oppose discontinuing the current statutory rates."6
Officially, the National Association of Broadcasters opposes the
proposed changes related to NGTMA."' Generally, localism
concerns aside (discussed below), many broadcasters favor the
current system because it provides them with stable compensation
for their programming and copyrights, while facilitating
114. Id. at 68.
115. Id.
116. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, NAB Statement on
Introduction of Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, (Dec. 16, 2011),
available at http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pressRelease.asp?
id=2659.
117. Id. (noting "NAB respectfully opposes the legislation. Current law
ensures access to quality local news, entertainment, sports and life-saving
weather warnings. The proposed changes to the Communications Act strike at
the core of free market negotiations and broadcast localism, thereby threatening
a community-based information and entertainment medium that serves tens of
millions of Americans each day.").
2232012]
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negotiations with potentially hundreds of copyright owners. This
year alone the system is expected to generate more than $2 billion
to be divided between local stations and the networks."' It is
understandable that disrupting the current system would give
broadcasters some pause.
There is, however, an alternative proposal that may allow
broadcasters to overcome both their compensation concerns as
well as the logistical concern of having to individually negotiate
each copyright license. The "rights aggregator model" would
essentially have broadcasters consolidate the performance rights to
all of their programs before entering into negotiations with an
MVPD, thereby offering a "single point" or "one-stop-shop" for
negotiation."9 As one media lawyer notes, the rights aggregator
model is already in place with respect to many non-broadcast
channels which, today, successfully allows "more than 500 non-
broadcast television channels [to be] distributed by MVPDs
nationwide without any need for government compulsory
licensing."' 20 The suggestion is that, should NGTMA repeal the
current compulsory copyright licensing system, broadcasters could
"easily ... aggregate the rights in the programs on their schedule
and then negotiate with MVPDs," just as many media companies
already do with respect to their non-broadcast channels.
Additionally, since many media companies today own both
broadcast and non-broadcast networks, the difficulty in
implementing this "new" business model would be, theoretically,
minimal.
Some commentators suggest that broadcasters' hesitation to
support regulatory change instead has more to do with a fear of the
unknown than it does with their purported concerns for localism
118. Harry A. Jessell, Now's Not the Time for Copyright Overhaul,
TVNEWSCHECK (July 20, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/
article/60912/nows-not-the-time-for-copyright-overhaul.
119. Padden, supra note 1.
120. Id. (noting that "[t]he success of the marketplace 'rights aggregator'
model in facilitating the distribution of the programs on non-broadcast channels
demonstrates that there is no longer any need for government [c]ompulsory
[1]icensing of broadcast programming.").
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and logistics.121 Specifically, one commentator, calling the
statutory licenses the "original sin" of video marketplace
regulation, suggests the copyright owners' fear of "the uncertainty
of a truly deregulated marketplace" causes the hesitation.122 As a
result, he suggests broadcasters have adopted a near-universal "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it" attitude. 2 3
The argument has weight. Economic theories have long
recognized the power of loss aversion, or the preference of
avoiding losses over acquiring gains. Yet, repealing a compulsory
licensing structure that seems clearly set below fair market value,
would theoretically benefit broadcasters and copyright owners
overall.'24
B. Ending Must-Carry, Carry One, Carry All, and Retransmission
Consent: The Changing Economics ofLocalism
When considering the potential implications of repealing the
retransmission consent, must-carry, and carry one, carry all rules,
it is important to evaluate the original purpose of the rules and
whether that purpose still requires regulatory protection. Many of
the statutory requirements Congress has put in place, from the
compulsory copyright licenses to the must-carry and
retransmission consent rules, go to a very specific purpose of
encouraging competition between broadcast, cable and satellite in
order to keep high quality, low cost programming available to
121. Adam Thierer, Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming,




124. The FCC has also endorsed support for repeal of the 17 U.S.C. §§ 111,
119 licenses: "We hereby recommend that the Congress re-examines the
compulsory license with a view toward replacing it with a regime of full
copyright liability for retransmission of both distant and local broadcast
signals . . . . Our analysis suggests that American viewers would reap significant
benefits from elimination of the compulsory license."' Padden, supra note 1




Cooper: Mass Media Mess: The Optimistic Deregulatory Goals of the "Next G
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:201
consumers. Furthermore, Congress also wanted to protect
localism and related interests of the consumer.
In its report to Congress on retransmission consent and
exclusivity rules, pursuant to the Satellite Home Viewer Extension
and Reauthorization Act of 2004, the FCC notes that when
Congress revived the must-carry rules in 1992, it "recognized that
television broadcast stations rely on advertising dollars to provide
free over-the-air local service and that competition from cable
television posed a threat to the economic viability of television
broadcast stations."125 It was a similar calculus that went into the
development of satellite's carry one, carry all rule. The 2005 FCC
report recognized that these three rules, along with network non-
duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules, "were adopted to
ensure that broadcasters are compensated fairly for the MVPDs'
retransmission of their signals, that MVPD retransmission of
distant signals does not undermine exclusivity protections
negotiated by broadcasters and their programming suppliers, and
that sports leagues' contractual arrangements for the exhibition of
sporting events are preserved."l 26
When Congress first introduced must-carry (first in 1962 before
doing away with it for sometime in the 1980s and then bringing it
back again in 1992), there was a legitimate degree of concern that,
without such a requirement, cable companies would decline to
carry some local broadcast channels, especially the non-network
affiliated ones.127 The theory was, and to a large extent still is, that
the must-carry requirement offered added protection to ensure the
viability of free, over-the-air television.'2 8 Even today, when
Congress or an MVPD suggests finally abandoning the must-carry
requirements, network and local broadcasters alike bring up
125. FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND
EXCLUSiviTY RULES: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 208 OF THE
SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2004 25
(2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
260936Al.pdf [hereinafter SHVERA 208 Report].
126. Id. at 18.
127. Andrew L. Shapiro, Aiding the Final Push to the Digital Transition, 5
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original arguments of localism. In July 2012 testimony before the
Senate Commerce Committee regarding "The Cable Act at 20,"
National Association of Broadcasters President and CEO Gordon
Smith explained his view of the importance of localism, saying
"local television stations are an indispensable source for quality
entertainment, high-profile sporting events, emergency weather
warnings and disaster coverage that can literally make the
difference between life and death."'29
However, others have noted that the same localism concerns that
existed in 1962, did not exist when the Cable Act reestablished the
must-carry rules in 1992, and are even less of a concern today.'
The business models and technology that existed twenty and fifty
years ago have changed significantly-with more and more local
channels owned by multi-billion dollar corporations and
bandwidth of cable systems allowing for hundreds of channels.'
It raises questions as to whether the original worries that cable
operators would refuse to carry local broadcast signals are still
relevant.
Also, there is the argument that the economic realities of today's
marketplace have changed dramatically since 1992, altering the
balance between retransmission consent and must-carry or carry
one, carry all. Until recently, media companies, particularly
broadcast networks that directly own local stations in many of the
country's largest cities (known as owned-and-operated stations or
"O&O's"), have commonly allowed MVPDs to bypass
retransmission fees if the MVPD agreed to carry additional
programming owned by the parent broadcast network, often in the
form of additional, non-broadcast networks.'32 These bypass
129. The Cable Act at 20: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
& Tech., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of the Hon. Gordon H. Smith, President
and CEO, National Association of Broadcasters), available at
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pressRelease.asp?id=2782.
130. Shapiro, supra note 123, at 347.
131. Id.
132. Dockterman, supra note 4, at 20. WNBC-TV (NBC, New York),
KABC-TV (ABC, Los Angeles), and WBBM-TV (CBS, Chicago) are all
examples of O&O stations. NBC OWNED TELEVISION STATIONS,
http://www.nbcstations.com/multi-market/who-we-are/ (last visited Nov. 24,
2012); ABC OTV ONLINE, http://abclocal.go.com/mediakit/index.html (last
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agreements also provided an easy way for media companies to
negotiate their new or less popular channels into an MVPD's
lineup.' It is also a main reason why so many new, niche cable
channels were affordably launched over the past two decades.134
A hypothetical example may offer some help in explaining the
process: A small, local cable company approaches a local FOX
affiliated station which has opted for retransmission consent to ask
about fees or other compensation. The local FOX station refuses
to negotiate, and instead tells the cable company to deal with Fox
Entertainment Group in Los Angeles. Fox Entertainment Group
tells the local cable company that to get the local FOX station's
signal and programming it must also agree to carry an additional
bundle of other Fox-owned non-broadcast networks, which the
small, local cable company may or may not have initially wanted
to carry.
The issue is even more pronounced for cable companies dealing
with local ABC-affiliated stations. Since ABC owns ESPN,
cable's most popular non-broadcast network, it has a significant
advantage in negotiations; a local cable company must agree to
carry additional ABC programming or risk losing the must-have
programming available on ESPN. Larger cable companies such as
Comcast may at least be in a better position to challenge the
network owners because of their strength in local markets, but
smaller, local cable companies play an important competitive role
visited Nov. 24, 2012); Our Portfolio, CBS CORP.,
http://www.cbscorporation.com/portfolio.php?division=96 (last visited Nov. 24,
2012). Currently, an FCC rule limits the number of television stations one
owner can control so that no one owner can reach more than 39% of the
country's television households. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2012). Channels such as
ESPN (ABC/Disney) and Nickelodeon (CBS/Viacom) are examples of non-
broadcast networks. ESPN, NCTA,
http://www.ncta.com/OrganizationType/CableNetwork/1441.aspx (last visited
Nov. 24, 2012); Nickelodeon, NCTA,
http://www.ncta.com/OrganizationType/CableNetwork/1763.aspx (last visited
Nov. 24, 2012).
133. Dockterman, supra note 4, at 20. For example, if an MVPD wanted to
carry an ABC-owned broadcast station, they may have also been required to
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in the marketplace as well and often do not have equally strong
negotiating power. As the FCC notes, the retransmission consent
bartering that has developed, trading consent for additional
carriage commitments instead of fees, goes "beyond what
Congress envisioned."'3 5
Further complicating the issue, the media landscape today has
reached a level of near-saturation, which has resulted in less room
for new channels.'36 As a result, broadcasters are starting to ask for
their retransmission consent fees instead of additional carriage
commitments, which, as noted, they are legally allowed to do.137
While the 2005 FCC report determined that, at the time, cash had
still not "emerged as a principal form of consideration for
retransmission consent," new studies suggest that within the past
seven years cash retransmission fees paid to broadcasters have
increased from an estimated $215 million in 2006 to nearly $1.5
billion in 2011 .138 And since most MVPDs and their subscribers
are not used to paying for the fees, cable and satellite companies
have balked at the changes.13
The problem is becoming an area of increasing frustration for
everyone involved, from the MVPDs, to the broadcasters, and,
ultimately, to the viewers. In roughly the first six months of 2012,
there have been at least twenty-two disputes resulting in carriage
refusal, channel dropping, or broadcast "blackouts."' 4 0 This
number is up from fifteen in 2011 and just four in 2010.'1 Recent
blackouts include: (1) an eight and a half hour blackout of ABC,
partly during the widely popular Academy Awards ceremony, on
Cablevision in March 2010142, along with various other disputes
during 2010 between both ABC and FOX, and Cablevision,143
135. SHVERA 208 Report, supra note 125, at 25.
136. Dockterman, supra note 4, at 20.
137. Id.
138. Napoli, supra note 21, at 347.
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including (2) a blackout of the first two games of the 2010 World
Series on local Fox affiliates in New York and Philadelphia;'44 (3)
a two-week blackout of Boston's WHDH-TV (NBC) and WLVI-
TV (CW), as well as Miami's WSVN-TV (FOX), during the
National Football League playoffs resulting from a dispute
between DirecTV and Sunbeam;'4 5 and (4) a nine-day blackout of
Viacom networks in June 2012 also stemming from a dispute with
DirecTV.'46 Today, one of the lasting concerns regarding the 1992
Act is the impact on the cable and satellite subscribers caught in
the middle.
While proponents of reform consistently point to outdated
sections of the relevant Communications Act rules, or areas of the
law they believe have resulted in the unintended consequences
discussed above, the FCC's report suggests rather that Congress
has sufficiently revised the provisions to "(1) enhance the viability
of over-the-air broadcasting; (2) promote localism; and (3)
advance regulatory parity between cable and DBS, while taking
account of their different operational structures."' 47 The FCC's
position is that the retransmission consent, must-carry, and carry
one, carry all rules complement one another and, together,
"provide that all local stations are assured of carriage even if their
audience is small, while also allowing more popular stations to
seek compensation (cash or in-kind) for the audience their
programming will attract for the cable or satellite operator."' 48
However, this position must be rethought in light of changing
economics, which have had a clear and substantial effect on
localism as well. With respect to such concerns, it is important to
note that the very rules Congress set in place to protect the public
interest have, in fact, created situations that have harmed those
144. Cablevision, Fox End Dispute Prior to World Series Game 3,
SPORTINGNEWS.COM (Oct. 30, 2010), http://aol.sportingnews.com/mlb/
story/2010-10-30/cablevision-fox-end-dispute-prior-to-world-series-game-3.
145. David Lieberman, DirecTV and Sunbeam Settle Boston and Miami TV
Carriage Disputes, DEADLINE.COM (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.deadline.com
/2012/01/directv-and-sunbeam-settle-boston-and-miami-tv-carriage-disputes.
146. Dockterman, supra note 4, at 20.
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interests. Consider two carriage disputes from 2011, both
involving LIN Television Corporation, where the broadcaster
either refused carriage or threatened to refuse carriage of local
signals to MVPDs in markets affected by Hurricane Irene and
Tropical Storm Lee as those storms approached.'49 As one
commentator aptly notes, "[g]iven the extent to which citizens
necessarily rely on local broadcasting during such times of natural
disaster, situations in which broadcasters are withholding signals
before, during, or after such disasters raise serious questions
whether the public interest is being served."'"
Broadcasters insist, on the other hand, the problem lies not with
them refusing carriage, but with large cable and satellite
companies-mainly DirecTV, DISH Network, and Time Warner
Cable-using their strong position in the market to gain unfair
advantages in carriage negotiations:
It's no coincidence that Time Warner Cable, DISH
and DirecTV are responsible for three out of every
four retransmission consent disruptions in 2012.
Rather than negotiate in the free market for the
most popular programming on TV, this cozy pay
TV cabal is manufacturing a phony crisis in hopes
that Congress will fix a 'problem' that these
companies are creating."'
Broadcasters argue that these three, market-dominant companies
are manipulating the marketplace through carriage disputes,
especially in large cities, to pressure Congress into repealing the
retransmission consent, must-carry, and carry one, carry all rules
with the goal of achieving greater flexibility in the programming
lineups they offer viewers.
Finally, there is the lingering issue of ensuring media diversity.
The retransmission consent, "must-carry," and "carry one, carry
149. Napoli, supra note 21, at 349.
150. Id. at 350.
151. NAB Statement on Free Market-Based Retransmission Consent Process,
NAB, July 18, 2012, http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pressRelease.
asp?id=2778 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
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all" rules, together with media-ownership regulations, were put
into place to ensure diversity and promote a range of competitive
and distinct media voices.15 2 The FCC still maintains an official
public policy of promoting media diversity and ensuring
competing viewpoints are heard.' However, as one long time
media lawyer in testimony before the Senate Committee of
Commerce, Science and Transportation in July 2012 notes, today,
in large part thanks to the internet, media is now more diverse and
accessible than ever before.'54 Alternatively, recent content
sharing agreements among local news stations and the creation of
collective local news services (LNS) in many top markets raise
other questions as to whether diversity is instead being
diminished."' The same localism and diversity concerns that
152. Federal Communications Commission, 2010 Quadrennial Regulatory
Review - Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Promoting Diversification of Ownership In the Broadcasting Services 8,
available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-notice-proposed-
rulemaking-media-ownership-rules (noting that "[t]he Commission has relied on
its media ownership rules to ensure that diverse viewpoints and perspectives are
available to the American people in the content they receive over the broadcast
airwaves. The policy is premised on the First Amendment, which 'rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."' (quoting
Assoc.'d Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
153. See id. at 7-8.
154. Padden, supra note 1 ("Today, I find myself almost drowning in the
plethora of diverse news outlets competing for my time. I start each morning in
Boulder, Colorado watching multiple channels of broadcast and cable news
while combing through online news sources on my iPad - The New York
Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The Denver Post, The
Los Angeles Times, Salon, Drudge, Real Clear Politics, The Hill, Politico, The
Daily Beast, The Wrap, Communications Daily, CableFax, etc. I even still read
my local newspaper - The Daily Camera. Some mornings I have a hard time
tearing myself away from all the diverse news sources at my fingertips so that I
can actually start my day.").
155. Michael Grotticelli, Chicago Stations Join to Share Video Crews for
ENG, BROADCAST ENG'G (May 8, 2009),
http://broadcastengineering.com/news/chicago-stations-join-share-video-crews-
eng. LNS agreements allows local news channels that choose to participate to
share news gathering resources, including photographers and assignment
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Congress evaluated before passing the retransmission consent,
must-carry, and carry one, carry all rules must be rethought with
respect to today's economic and technological changes.
C. Logistical Problems with NGTMA
While, as discussed, there are several potential benefits to
deregulation under NGTMA, the proposed Bills as written raise
legitimate logistical concerns that will likely prevent such
comprehensive regulatory reform from passing. In a very concrete
way, NGTMA essentially looks to undo many decades' worth of
government regulations purposefully designed and intended to
protect both interests of localism and consumer access.
Much of Congress's hesitation to pass such full scale reform has
to do with the same familiar uncertainty concerns. Notably, nearly
every potential party has voiced a similar nervousness. The U.S.
Copyright Office, again in its 2008 report, supported a general
revision of the current system, but noted that "the provisions of [17
U.S.C. §§ 111, 119] to some extent, are tightly knotted together
into a larger regulatory fabric.""' The report acknowledges that
"the addition or subtraction of certain provisions may have the
unintended consequence of harming program distributors,
copyright owners, and subscribers."' 7 The Copyright Office also
editors, to cover press conferences and other commonly reported news events.
Id. Proponents indicate that content sharing agreements free up news resources
to allow greater coverage of news stories, while opponents suggest the
agreements are easy ways for local broadcasters to cut personnel costs in tough
economic times. Id. (noting that "[e]ach station pledged to preserve its
'editorial integrity' with the arrangement and argued it was necessary in these
difficult economic times[,]" but also that "it would be easy for LNS to turn into
a way for member stations to reduce newsroom personnel and other staff."). But
see Michael Malone, Atlanta Pool Springs Leak, BROAD. & CABLE (July 13,
2009), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/314853-AtlantaPoolSprings
Leak.php (noting that Atlanta CBS-affiliate WGCL-TV pulled out of its
market's content share agreement with Fox O&O WAGA-TV and Gannett's
NBC-affiliated WXIA-TV, "citing the pool's limitation on station
differentiation.").
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recognizes that changes to the current system would "disrupt
settled expectations.""' It notes that the current system is "the
result of a carefully balanced legislative compromise and changes
to even one provision could have a domino effect throughout the
statute." 5 9
Meanwhile, the 2005 FCC report notes that "[b]ecause of the
interplay among these various laws and rules, when any piece of
the legal landscape governing carriage of television broadcast
signals is changed, other aspects of that landscape also require
careful examination. "160 The National Cable and
Telecommunications Association (NCTA) states that the current
compulsory copyright system, "with all its flaws, at least provides
a measure of predictability and stability ensuring that cable
customers in markets large and small can continue to enjoy
programming on broadcast stations." 61  Likewise, the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) warns that "the current cable
statutory license system has become integrated into marketplace
structures and relationships and warns that any type of proposed
modifications could produce unintended consequences." 6 2
Finally, there is the concern of how broadcasters and MVPDs
would negotiate the thousands of weekly programming copyrights
should NGTMA erase many of the statutory provisions that
facilitate that process. 6 1 One suggestion would be to not
completely eliminate the provisions, as NGTMA proposes, but
rather reform the provisions to better reflect the changing
158. Id. at 106.
159. Id. at 106-07.
160. SHVERA 208 Report, supra note 125, at 18 (citing Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)).
161. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 105.
162. Id. at 105-06.
163. Padden, supra note I (noting that "[a]s memorialized in the House
Report, the cable compulsory license was justified by the universal belief 'that it
would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to
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technology and market realities of today, namely by unifying the
licenses under which cable and satellite currently operate."
V Conclusion
The intense attention the NGTMA is receiving indicates that the
proposed legislation targets important areas of reform. While
broadcasters and copyright owners want the compulsory copyright
rates to better reflect where they believe the market prices would
be if they were allowed to negotiate independent of the
regulations, they nevertheless want the stability that comes from
the current system because at least it ensures consistent returns on
their programming investments. MVPDs favor the acknowledged
low rates, but would prefer the retransmission consent rules, must-
carry, and carry one, carry all rules lifted in order to have greater
flexibility in deciding what programming to offer. Finally,
consumers would prefer lower costs, more choices in
programming, and a curtailment of some of the carriage dispute
blackouts that have been escalating over the last several years.
The main impediment to necessary reform is economic
uncertainty. The broadcasting industry has never operated under a
free market system, and, while there inevitably would be some
transitional growing pains, there could also be some significant
benefits to deregulation, such as a fair market value for program
copyrights, and negotiation rules that better reflect the current
system. Of course, the country will never know how it might work
unless a new system is put into effect.
While the NGTMA Bills provide an opportunity for Congress to
update a clearly outdated regulatory system, the reality is that
many of the key parties involved in the debate, though recognizing
certain deficiencies, are not yet ready for such comprehensive
reform. Though well-intentioned in its goals and worth
consideration as Congress continues to review the current
regulatory system, NGTMA nevertheless is likely more optimistic
164. SHVERA 109 Report, supra note 15, at 204-05 (noting that "[t]he cable
and satellite industries are now more similar than they are different. Both offer
local broadcast signals to subscribers and both offer approximately the same
mix of regional and nationally delivered non-broadcast content.").
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than it is practical. At least for now, it appears, comprehensive
change will have to wait.
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